Europe Needs To Learn From Mistakes With Russia To Get Its China Policy Right, Warns Leading MEP

PRAGUE — Europe is still “naive” in its relations with China and will need to learn some tough lessons from its past national security failings with Russia if it is to successfully navigate ties with Beijing in the future, warned Reinhard Buetikofer, a leading member of the European Parliament (MEP).

“There has been so much naivety regarding China in European capitals that we can reduce it continuously for some time and still not reach the [bottom],” Buetikofer told RFE/RL in an interview in the Czech capital, where he attended the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) summit, a cross-party gathering of politicians focused on the Asian powerhouse.

Buetikofer chairs the European Parliament’s delegation on China and has become one of the EU’s most hawkish voices when it comes to dealing with Beijing, often speaking against Chinese policies on Taiwan, its economic strong-arming of countries such as Lithuania in 2021, and its support for Moscow amid its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, despite Beijing’s claims of being neutral.

The German politician, who formerly co-chaired the country’s Green Party before transitioning to Brussels, says he firmly disagrees with that notion. In a wide-ranging interview with RFE/RL, he took aim at Beijing’s equivocation for the Kremlin over the war in Ukraine and said the EU needs to apply the hard lessons learned from its dependence on Russian energy to the bloc’s current ones on the Chinese market and its influence over vital supply chains for strategic industries.

“I think it is fair to say that this experience with Russia has taught us a lesson that should also be applied to our China relations,” Buetikofer said. “China is supporting Russia and does not want Russia to lose in any meaningful way. I certainly do not see them as anywhere near a neutral position. They are trying to take advantage of the war in Ukraine.”

The question of how to handle the long-term relationship with China has taken on a new dimension within the EU since the beginning of the war in Ukraine and fueled uncomfortable conversations in Brussels over future dealings with the world’s second-largest economy.

While Beijing has stopped short of providing Moscow with lethal military support for the war in Ukraine, China has extended a crucial economic lifeline to Russia, with Chinese customs data showing thegrowing trade in dual-use commercial goods that are repurposed for military means — as well as small-scale arms shipments from private Chinese suppliers.

Beijing has also gone on a global diplomatic push to burnish itself as a peacemaker.

In February, it unveiled its 12-point proposal to hold peace talks between Moscow and Kyiv that was criticized in the West for attempting to freeze the conflict along lines favorable to Moscow — but it received support across the Global South.

In August, China also participated in diplomatic talks in Saudi Arabia centered around the war in Ukraine.

“The Chinese can’t be excluded and they want to sit at the table,” Buetikofer said. “But they’re there for their own interests and to negotiate an outcome that would benefit [Russian President Vladimir] Putin.”

Moving The Needle In Brussels

For Europe’s politicians, the question of how to handle Beijing is an awkward one. They are under pressure to protect their economies from exposure to the whims of the Chinese Communist Party — and to take seriously the security risks of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s continued alliance with Putin.

At the same time, EU businesses rely on China for exports worth 230 billion euros ($248 billion) per year.

Germany is wary of upsetting its vast business interests in China — which has been its largest trading partner for the past six years — and has taken on growing importance after business with Russia collapsed with a flurry of new sanctions in February 2022.

France — another key pillar within the EU — has been skeptical of following the U.S. approach, which has centered on increasing pressure on Beijing and limiting Western economic exposure to China.

“Of course, the dependency on China is not focused on just one issue like fossil-energy supplies with Russia,” Buetikofer said. “It’s more widespread and that makes it more difficult to address.”

Despite the lack of cohesion across the 27-country bloc, Brussels has been increasingly active in forming new policies to deal with China.

The EU has pushed a new strategy for the Indo-Pacific region that increasingly frames Beijing as a long-term rival and, in March, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called for a reassessment of the bloc’s relations with China, warning that “we cannot close our eyes to the fact that China is not only an economic partner but also a systemic rival.”

June and July saw the publication of a European Commission action plan on economic security and the German government’s new China strategy, both of which drew new, harder lines toward Beijing.

‘High Level Of Suspicion And Pushback’

Brussels has also found added common ground with Washington on what it calls “de-risking” from the Chinese economy, as opposed to “de-coupling,” which had been part of the U.S. approach. The practice calls for limiting economic dependencies with China in certain strategic areas, rather than a wider effort to disentangle from the Chinese economy.

Buetikofer says that this momentum has largely been the result of Beijing’s own bellicose actions toward Brussels and individual members in recent years. In particular, he points to an episode in 2021 when Beijing blacklisted a group of European lawmakers (Buetikofer among them), experts, and diplomats over the bloc’s placing of sanctions on four Chinese officials for rights violations in Xinjiang.

The fallout from the incident led to an EU-China investment treaty being frozen. China has attempted to revive the pact, with its diplomats reportedly making an offer for China lifting its sanctions in return for Brussels ratifying the trade deal. Buetikofer called such attempts “pipe dreams,” adding that the treaty is now “as dead as a doornail.”

“There is no prevailing illusion in Brussels that China is just a partner,” he said. “In a relatively short period of time, China has been able to foster a high level of suspicion and pushback.”

Buetikofer has been at the forefront of this shift but says that nobody “ever moves a needle alone,” pointing to the support that the new line on China has received across political parties in the European Parliament and elsewhere in Brussels.

Buetikofer does not plan to stand for reelection in 2024. Janka Oertel, the Asia director of the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank in Berlin and a well-known China expert, announced in June that she’s applying for a seat on the German Green party’s candidate list for the European Parliament elections in 2024 and Buetikofer has offered support for her candidacy.

“We have managed to create a common understanding on China policy,” Buetikofer said. “I am fully convinced that this is not superficial and certainly expect that it will continue.”

This will be tested as the calendar moves into 2024. Presidential elections in the United States and Taiwan could affect policy on both sides of the Atlantic, and EU-wide votes, as well European Parliament elections, could determine if Brussels’ current course is permanent or temporary.

For the veteran German politician, the future direction is clear.

“We’re not going back to the age of illusionism,” he said.